

# Confinement: prepare for the worst

- We realize that an application may be compromised - We want to run applications we may not completely trust
- Not always possible
- · Limit an application to use a subset of the system's resources
- · Make sure a misbehaving application cannot harm the rest of the system

# How about access control?

- · Limit damage via access control
- E.g., run servers as a low-privilege user
- Proper read/write/search controls on files ... or role-based policies
- · ACLs don't address applications
- Cannot set permissions for a process: "don't allow access to anything else"
- At the mercy of default (other) permissions
- We are responsible for changing protections of every file on the system that could be accessed by *other* 
  - And hope users don't change that
- Or use more complex mandatory access control mechanisms ... if available

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# Not high assurance

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# Compromised applications

- · Some services run as root
- · What if an attacker compromises the app and gets root access?

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- Create a new account
- Install new programs
- "Patch" existing programs (e.g., add back doors)
- Modify configuration files or services
- Add new startup scripts (launch agents, cron jobs, etc.)
- Change resource limits
- Change file permissions (or ignore them!)
- Change the IP address of the system

# We can regulate access to some resources POSIX setrlimit() system call - Maximum CPU time that can be used - Maximum data size - Maximum files that can be created - Maximum memory a process can lock - Maximum # of open files - Maximum # of processes for a user - Maximum amount of physical memory used - Maximum stack size

# Other resources to protect


- · CPU time
- · Amount of memory used: physical & virtual
- Disk space
- · Network identity & access


# Network identity


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- · Each system has an IP address unique to the network
- Compromised application can exploit address-based access control
   E.g., log in to remote machines that think you're trusted
- · Intrusion detection systems can get confused









# Problems?

- · Does not limit network access
- · Does not protect network identity
- · Applications are still vulnerable to root compromise
- chroot must be available only to root
- If not...
- Create a jail directory mkdir /tmp/jail
- Create a link to the su command ln /bin/su /tmp/jail/su
- Copy or link libraries & shell ...
- Create an /etc directory mkdir /tmp/jail/etc
- Create password file(s) with a known password for root
- Enter the jail chroot /tmp/jail
- su root su will validate against the password file in the jail!

# Escaping a chroot jail


# If you can become root in a jail, you have access to <u>all system calls</u>


- Example: create a device file for the disk – On Linux/Unix/BSD, all non-network devices have filenames – Even memory has a filename (/dev/mem)
- Create a memory device (*mknod* system call)
   Change kernel data structures to remove your jail
- Create a disk device to access your raw disk
   Mount it within your jail and you have access to the whole file system
   Get what you want, change the admin password, ...

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- Send signals to kill other processes (doesn't escape the jail but causes harm to others)
- · Reboot the system

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# Problems Ocarse policies All or nothing access to parts of the file system Does not work for apps like a web browser Needs access to files outside the jail (e.g., saving files, uploading attachments) Does not prevent malicious apps from Accessing the network & other machines Trying to crash the host OS BSD Jails is a BSD-only solution Pretty good for running things like DNS servers and web servers Not all that useful for user applications

Linux	(Namespaces	
	t only changed the root o	f the filesystem namespace
Emax		following namespaces.
IPC	System V IPC, POSIX message queues	Objects created in an IPC namespace are visible to all other processes only in that namespace
Network	Network devices, stacks, ports	Isolates IP protocol stacks, IP routing tables, firewalls, socket port #s
Mount	Mount points	Mount points can be different in different processes
PID	Process IDs	Different PID namespaces can have the same PID – child cannot see parent processes or other namespaces
User	User & group IDs	Per-namespace user/group IDs. You can be root in a namespace with restricted privileges
UTS	Hostname and NIS domain name	sethostname and setdomainname affect only the namespace
		See namespaces(7)

# Linux Namespaces

Unlike chroot, unprivileged users can create namespaces

### • unshare()

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- System call that dissociates parts of the process execution context
   Examples
- · Unshare IPC namespace, so it's separate from other processes
- Unshare PID namespace, so the thread gets its own PID namespace for its children
- clone() system call to create a child process
- Like fork() but allows you to control what is shared with the parent
   Open files, root of the file system, current working directory, IPC namespace, network namespace, memory, etc.
- setns() system call to associate a thread with a namespace
   A thread can associate itself with an existing namespace in /proc/[pid]/ns

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# Linux Capabilities

# How do we restrict what root can do in a namespace?

- UNIX systems distinguished privileged vs. unprivileged processes
   Privileged = UID 0 = root ⇒ kernel bypasses all permission checks
- If we can provide limited elevation of privileges to a process:
   If a process becomes root, it would still be limited in what it could do
- E.g., no ability to set UID to root, no ability to mount filesystems

N.B.: These capabilities have nothing to do with capability lists

# Linux Capabilities

# We can explicitly grant subsets of privileges that root users get

- Linux divides privileges into 38 distinct controls, including: CAP\_CHOWN: make arbitrary changes to file owner and group IDs CAP\_DAC\_OVERRIDE: bypass read/write/execute checks CAP\_KILL: bypass permission checks for sending signals CAP\_KILL: bypass permission checks for sending signals CAP\_NET\_ADMIN: network management operations CAP\_NET\_RAW: allow RAW sockets CAP\_SETUID: arbitrary manipulation of process UIDs CAP\_SYS\_CHROOT: enable chroot
- These are per-thread attributes
   Can be set via the *prctl* system call

# Linux Control Groups (cgroups)

# Limit the amount of resources a process tree can use

- · CPU, memory, block device I/O, network
- E.g., a process tree can use at most 25% of the CPU
- Limit # of processes within a group
- Interface = cgroup file system: /sys/fs/cgroup
- Namespaces + cgroups + capabilities = lightweight process virtualization
   Process gets the <u>illusion</u> that it is running on its own Linux system, isolated from other processes


# Vulnerabilities


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- · Bugs have been found
- User namespace: unprivileged user was able to get full privileges
- But comprehension is a bigger problem
- Namespaces do not prohibit a process from making privileged system calls
   They control resources that those calls can manage
- · The system will see only the resources that belong to that namespace
- User namespaces grant non-root users increased access to system capabilities
   Design concept: instead of dropping privileges from root, provide limited elevation to non-root users
- A real root process with its admin capability removed can restore it
   If it creates a user namespace, the capability is restored to the root user in that namespace – although limited in function

# Summary

- chroot
- FreeBSD Jails
- Linux namespaces, capabilities, and control groups
   Control groups
  - Allow processes to be grouped together control resources for the group Capabilities
  - Limit what root can do for a process & its children
  - Namespaces
  - Restrict what a process can see & who it can interact with: PIDs, User IDs, mount points, IPC, network





# How did we address these problems?

- Sysadmin effort
  - Service downtime, frustration, redeployment
- Run every service on a separate system
- Mail server, database, web server, app server,  $\ldots$
- Expensive! ... and overkill

# · Deploy virtual machines

- Kind of like running services on separate systems
- Each service gets its own instance of the OS and all supporting software


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
Heavyweight approach

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Time share between operating systems

# What are containers? Containers: created to package & distribute software - Focus on services, not end-user apps - Software systems usually require a bunch of stuff: • Libraries, multiple applications, configuration tools, ... - Container = image containing the application environment • Can be installed and run on any system Key insight: Encapsulate software, configuration, & dependencies into one package





# Initially ... Docker

- First super-popular container
- · Designed to provide Platform-as-a-Service capabilities
- Combined Linux cgroups & namespaces into a single easy-to-use package - Enabled applications to be deployed consistently anywhere as one
- package
- · Docker Image
- Package containing applications & supporting libraries & files - Can be deployed on many environments

# Make deployment easy

- Git-like commands: docker push, docker commit, ...
- Make it easy to reuse image and track changes
   Download updates instead of entire images
- Keep Docker images immutable (read-only) - Run containers by creating a writable layer to temporarily store runtime changes

# Later Docker additions · Docker Hub: cloud based repository for docker images · Docker Swarm: deploy multiple containers as one abstraction

# Not Just Linux

- Microsoft introduced Containers in Windows Server 2016 and support for Docker
- · Windows Server Containers
- Assumes trusted applications
- Misconfiguration or design flaws may permit an app to escape its container
- Hyper-V Containers

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- Each has its own copy of the Windows kernel & dedicated memory
- Same level of isolation as in virtual machines
- Essentially a VM that can be coordinated via Docker
- Less efficient in startup time & more resource intensive
- Designed for hostile applications to run on the same host


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
# **Container Orchestration**

- · We wanted to manage containers across systems
- Multiple efforts
- Marathon/Apache Mesos (2014), Kubernetes (2015), Nomad, Docker Swarm, ...
- Google designed Kubernetes for container orchestration
- Google invented Linux control groups
- Standard deployment interface
- Scale rapidly (e.g., Pokemon Go)
- Open source (unlike Docker Swarm)

# **Container Orchestration** Kubernetes orchestration - Handle multiple containers and start each one at the right time - Handle storage

- Deal with hardware and container failure
- · Automatic restart & migration
- Add or remove containers in response to demand
- Integrates with the Docker engine, which runs the actual container






# Security Concerns

## Kernel exploits

- All containers share the same kernel
- Denial of service attacks
- If one container can monopolize a resource, others suffer
- Privilege escalation
- Shouldn't happen with capabilities ... But there might be bugs
- Origin integrity

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- Where is the container from and has it been tampered?



# Machine Virtualization

Normally all hardware and I/O managed by one operating system


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### Machine virtualization

- Abstract (virtualize) control of hardware and I/O from the OS
- Partition a physical computer to act like several real machines
- Manipulate memory mappings
- Set system timers
- Access devices
- Migrate an entire OS & its applications from one machine to another

# 1972: IBM System 370

- Allow kernel developers to share a computer



# Hypervisor

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
Hypervisor: Program in charge of virtualization


- Aka Virtual Machine Monitor
- Provides the illusion that the OS has full access to the hardware


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
- Arbitrates access to physical resources
- Presents a set of virtual device interfaces to each host


# Machine Virtualization An OS is just a bunch of code! • Privileged vs. unprivileged instructions • If regular applications execute privileged instructions, they trap • Operating systems are allowed to execute privileged instructions • If running kernel code, the VMM catches the trap and emulates the instruction • Trap & Emulate















































# Web plug-ins · External binaries that add capabilities to a browser · Loaded when content for them is embedded in a page · Examples: Adobe Flash, Adobe Reader, Java





# Java Language

- · Type-safe & easy to use - Memory management and range checking
- Designed for an interpreted environment: JVM
- · No direct access to system calls



# JVM Security

- · Complex process
- ~20 years of bugs ... hope the big ones have been found!
- Buffer overflows found in the C support library
- C support library buggy in general
- · Generally, the JVM is considered insecure
- But Java in general is pretty secure
  Array bounds checking, memory management
- Security manager with access controls
- Use of native methods allows you to bypass security checks

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# **OS-Level Sandboxes**

# Example: the Apple Sandbox

· Create a list of rules that is consulted to see if an operation is permitted

# · Components:

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- Set of libraries for initializing/configuring policies per process
  - Server for kernel logging
  - Kernel extension using the TrustedBSD API for enforcing individual policies
     Kernel support extension providing regular expression matching for policy enforcement
- sandbox-exec command & sandbox\_init function
  - sandbox-exec: calls sandbox\_init() before fork() and exec()
  - sandbox\_init(kSBXProfileNoWrite, SANDBOX\_NAMED, errbuf);

# Apple sandbox setup & operation

# sandbox\_init:

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- Convert human-readable policies into a binary format for the kernel
- Policies passed to the kernel to the TrustedBSD subsystem
- TrustedBSD subsystem passes rules to the kernel extension
- Kernel extension installs sandbox profile rules for the current process

# Operation: intercept system calls

- System calls hooked by the TrustedBSD layer will pass through Sandbox.kext for policy enforcement
- The extension will consult the list of rules for the current process


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- Some rules require pattern matching (e.g., filename pattern)

# Apple sandbox policies

# Some pre-written profiles:

- Prohibit TCP/IP networking
- Prohibit all networking
- Prohibit file system writes
- Restrict writes to specific locations (e.g., /var/tmp)
- Perform only computation: minimal OS services



# Virtual CPUs (sort of)

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What time-sharing operating systems give us

- Each process feels like it has its own CPU & memory
   But cannot execute privileged CPU instructions
   (e.g., modify the MMU or the interval timer, halt the processor, access I/O)
- · Illusion created by OS preemption, scheduler, and MMU
- · User software has to "ask the OS" to do system-related functions
- Containers, BSD Jails, namespaces give us operating system-level virtualization

