




# Recitation: Web Security

April 11th, 2018  
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# Security Model



# Browser Security

- **Same Origin Policy:** Permit scripts in one page to access data in a second page only if both pages have the same origin
  - Origin = { URI scheme, hostname, port number }
- Frames should not be able to communicate if they're not in the same origin
- **Cross-Origin-Resource-Sharing (CORS):** A page can contain content from multiple origins
  - Can allow you to define “acceptable” domains under the same-origin policy

# Cookies and XSRF


- Websites use cookies to track client progress through a website
- Enables **XSRF: “Cross Site Request Forgery”** Attacks on weak websites
  - Planting a link or forging a cookie in order to allow access to a client’s browsing session
  - Example: [http://mybank.com/?action=transfer&amount=100000&to=attacker\\_account](http://mybank.com/?action=transfer&amount=100000&to=attacker_account)
  - Tom Scott on XSRF: <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vRBihr41JTo>
- **Defenses:** *Referrer* header in a cookie or require unique tokens per session
  - JWT (JSON Web Token) <https://jwt.io/introduction/>
  - OAuth2



# JSON Web Tokens (JWT)

*“self-contained way for securely transmitting information between parties as a JSON object. This information can be verified and trusted because it is digitally signed. JWTs can be signed using a secret (with the **HMAC** algorithm) or a public/private key pair using **RSA**.”*

*“Signed tokens can verify the integrity of the claims contained within it, while encrypted tokens hide those claims from other parties. When tokens are signed using public/private key pairs, the signature also certifies that only the party holding the private key is the one that signed it.”*


<https://jwt.io/introduction/>





# OAuth 2.0

## Authorization Code Flow



# XSS - Cross Site Scripting

- Code injection attack that allows attacker to execute JavaScript in a user's browser
  - Exploit vulnerability in a website the attacker visits
  - Possible if the website includes user input in its pages
- Example: a weak chatting system (GAH)
- **Possible damage:** Hijack a session, Create arbitrary HTTP requests with arbitrary content via XMLHttpRequest, Make arbitrary DOM modifications, Install keyloggers, Download malware/miners, run JavaScript ransomware, try phishing by manipulating the DOM and adding a fake login page.



```
28
29 socket.on('chatMessage', function(from, msg){
30     var me = $('#user').val();
31     var color = (from == me) ? 'green' : '#009afd';
32     var from = (from == me) ? 'Me' : from;
33     $('#messages').append('<div class="row"><b style="color:' + color + '">' + from + '</b>: ' + msg + '</div>');
34 });
35
```

# XSS Defenses

Sanitize ALL user input!!

- **OWASP:**  
[https://www.owasp.org/index.php/Injection\\_Prevention\\_Cheat\\_Sheet\\_in\\_Java](https://www.owasp.org/index.php/Injection_Prevention_Cheat_Sheet_in_Java)
- **XSS Defense Cheat Sheet:**  
[https://www.owasp.org/index.php/XSS\\_\(Cross\\_Site\\_Scripting\)\\_Prevention\\_Cheat\\_Sheet](https://www.owasp.org/index.php/XSS_(Cross_Site_Scripting)_Prevention_Cheat_Sheet)
- **Content Security Policy (CSP):** Allows website owners to identify approved origins of content & types of content
- `String safe = Jsoup.clean(unsafe, Whitelist.basic()); //java`

# SQL Injections

- Similar to XSS, but inject SQL Code to mess with a database
- Occurs when **volatile data** is passed in as part of a query
  - statement = "**SELECT \* FROM** users **WHERE** name = '' + **userName** + '";"
- Or when the Query can be exposed via a URL
  - [https://mywebsite.com/important?query=select%20\\*%20from%20some\\_table%20where...](https://mywebsite.com/important?query=select%20*%20from%20some_table%20where...)
- **Blind SQL Injection:** Results of a query are not visible to the attacker
- **Tom Scott on SQL Injections:** [https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=\\_jKylhJtPml](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_jKylhJtPml)

```
1 @app.route('/api/v1.0/storeAPI/<item>', methods=['GET'])
```

```
2 def searchAPI(item):
```

```
3     g.db = connect_db()
```

```
4     g.db.execute("SELECT * FROM shop_items WHERE name = '%s'" % item)  
5     curs = g.db.execute("SELECT * FROM shop_items WHERE name = '%s'" % item)
```

```
6     results = [dict(name=row[0], quantity=row[1], price=row[2]) for row in curs.fetchall()]
```

```
7     g.db.close()
```

```
8     return jsonify(results)
```

```
9 )
```

```
1  
2 @app.route('/api/v1.0/storeAPI/<item>', methods=['GET'])
```

```
3 def searchAPI(item):
```

```
4     g.db = connect_db()
```

```
5     #curs = g.db.execute("SELECT * FROM shop_items WHERE name=?", item) #The safe way to actually get data from db
```

```
6     curs = g.db.execute("SELECT * FROM shop_items WHERE name = '%s'" % item)
```

```
7     results = [dict(name=row[0], quantity=row[1], price=row[2]) for row in curs.fetchall()]
```

```
8     g.db.close()
```

```
9     return jsonify(results)
```

```
10
```

# SQL Injection Defenses

Sanitize your input!!!!

- A query should not be a part of the URL. If it is, use **Database permissions** to disallow any queries except for read queries.
- Escaping input:
  - Every occurrence of a single quote in a parameter must be replaced by two single quotes to form a valid SQL string literal
  - PHP uses `mysqli_real_escape_string();`
- Parameterized Values (placeholder values and prepared statements) : '?'
  - Resilient against SQL injection because values which are transmitted later using a different protocol are not compiled.
  - If the statement template is not derived from external input, SQL injection cannot occur.

Database  
permissions on  
MS SQL Server

```
deny select on sys.sysobjects to webdatabaselogon;  
deny select on sys.objects to webdatabaselogon;  
deny select on sys.tables to webdatabaselogon;  
deny select on sys.views to webdatabaselogon;  
deny select on sys.packages to webdatabaselogon;
```

Escaping  
(PHP)

```
$mysqli = new mysqli('hostname', 'db_username', 'db_password', 'db_name');  
$query = sprintf("SELECT * FROM `Users` WHERE UserName='%s' AND Password='%s'",  
    $mysqli->real_escape_string($username),  
    $mysqli->real_escape_string($password));  
$mysqli->query($query);
```

### Prepared statements



1. **Prepare:** At first, the application creates the statement template and send it to the DBMS. Certain values are left unspecified, called *parameters*, *placeholders* or *bind variables* (labelled "?" below):

```
INSERT INTO products (name, price) VALUES (?, ?);
```

2. Then, the DBMS compiles (parses, [optimizes](#) and translates) the statement template, and stores the result without executing it.

3. **Execute:** At a later time, the application supplies (or *binds*) values for the parameters of the statement template, and the DBMS executes the statement (possibly returning a result). The application may execute the statement as many times as it wants with different values. In the above example, it might supply "bike" for the first parameter and "10900" for the second parameter.

# Assignment Overview





The End