

CS 419: Computer Security

Week 6: Part 2

POSIX Permissions

Paul Krzyzanowski





© 2025 Paul Krzyzanowski. No part of this content may be reproduced or reposted in whole or in part in any manner without the permission of the copyright owner.

File permissions

- Access isn't all or nothing
- Objects can have different access permissions

UNIX (POSIX) permission model

- Access permissions: read (r), write (w), execute (x)
 - All independently set
- Each file has an owner



Example: Limited ACLs in POSIX systems

- **Problem: ACLs takes up a varying amount of space**
 - They won't fit in a fixed-size inode
- **UNIX Compromise:**
 - A file defines access rights for three domains: the **owner**, the **group**, and **everyone else**
 - **Permissions**
 - Read, write, execute (for files), search (for directories)
 - Set user ID: execute with user permissions of the file's owner
 - Set group ID: execute with the group permissions of the file's group
 - Default permissions set by the **umask** system call
 - **chown** system call changes the object's owner
 - **chgrp** system call changes the object's group
 - **chmod** system call changes the object's permissions

How do you share files?

- **Groups & everyone else (other)**
- **A user has one user ID but may belong to multiple groups**
 - One current default group ID for new objects
 - Multiple groups
- **Other = all others (users who are not the owner or group members)**
- **File access permissions are expressed as:**

`rwXrwxrwx`

user group other

```
$ ls -l /bin/ls
-rwxr-xr-x 1 root root 138216 Feb  7 2024 /bin/ls
```

Permission checking

if you are the owner of the file
only owner permissions apply

if you are part of a group the file belongs to
only group permissions apply

else “other” permissions apply

I cannot read this file even if I'm in the *localaccounts* group:

```
$ ls -l testfile
----rw---- 1 paul  localaccounts  6 Jan 30 10:37 testfile
```

Execute permission

- **Distinct from read**
- **You may have `execute-only` access**
 - This takes away your right to copy the file
... or inspect it
 - But the OS can load it & run it

Windows

- **Windows has users & groups but more permissions**
 - Read, write, execute
 - Also: delete, change permission, change ownership
- **Users & resources can be partitioned into groups & domains**
 - Each *domain* can have its own administrator
 - HR can manage users
 - Individual departments can manage printers
- **Trust can be inherited in one or both directions**
 - *department resources* domains may trust the *user* domain
 - *user* domain may not trust *department resources* domains

What about directories?

- **Directories are just files that map *names* to *inode numbers***
- **Permissions have special meaning**
 - *Write* = permission to create a file in the directory
 - *Read* = permission to list the contents of a directory
 - *Execute* = permission to search through the directory
- **If you have *write* access to the directory of a file, you can *delete* the file**
 - Even if you don't have write access to the file itself
- **If you don't have *write* access to the directory**
 - You cannot *create* or *delete* a file ... even if you have *write* access to it

Changing permissions

The **chmod** command

user = read, write, execute
group = read, execute
other = -none-

- Set permissions

```
$ chmod u=rwx,g=rx,o= testfile
```

```
$ ls -l testfile
```

```
-rwxr-x--- 1 paul localaccounts 6 Jan 30 10:37 testfile
```

- Add permissions

```
$ chmod go+w testfile
```

```
$ ls -l testfile
```

```
-rwxrwx-w- 1 paul localaccounts 6 Jan 30 10:37 testfile
```

- Remove permissions

```
$ chmod o-w testfile
```

```
$ ls -l testfile
```

```
-r-xrwx--- 1 paul localaccounts 6 Jan 30 10:37 testfile
```

Changing permissions

Or the old-fashioned way – specify an octal bitmask

- Set permissions


```
$ chmod 754 testfile
```

```
$ ls -l testfile
```

```
-rwxr-xr-- 1 paul localaccounts 6 Jan 30 10:37 testfile
```

7	5	4
111	101	100
rwx	r-x	r--
user	group	other

File permissions are stored in the file's inode



Sometimes groups aren't enough

Access Control Lists (ACL)

- **Explicit list of permissions for users**
- **Supported by most operating systems**
 - Windows $\geq$ XP
 - macOS $\geq$ 10.4
 - Linux $\geq$ ext3 file system + acl package

Example: Full ACLs in POSIX systems

What if we want to use a full ACL?

- **Extended attributes:** stored outside of the inode
 - Hold an ACL
 - And other name:value attributes
- **Enumerated list of permissions on users and groups**
 - Operations on all objects:
 - *delete, readattr, writeattr, readextattr, writeextattr, readsecurity, writesecurity, chown*
 - Operations on directories
 - *list, search, add_file, add_subdirectory, delete_child*
 - Operations on files
 - *read, write, append, execute*
 - Inheritance controls

ACLs and ACEs

Access Control List (ACL) = list of **Access Control Entries (ACE)**

- **ACE identifies a user or group & permissions**
 - Files: read, write, execute, append
 - Directories:
list, search, read attributes, add file, add sub-directory, delete contents
- **“*Inheritance*” permission**
 - Files and directories can inherit ACL entries from the parent
- **Wildcards are often supported**
- See *chmod* on macOS or *setfacl* on Linux

Example ACL

<code>pxk.*</code>	<code>rwX</code>
<code>419-ta.*</code>	<code>rwX</code>
<code>*.faculty</code>	<code>rx</code>
<code>*.*</code>	<code>x</code>

- Users `pxk` and `419-ta` have *read-write-execute* access
- Users in the faculty group have *read-execute* access
- Others only have *execute* access

Search order

ACEs are evaluated in the order they are entered into the ACL

In this case, I don't have write access to the file:

419-ta.* rwx

*.faculty rx ← This is me ← This appears first & has priority

pxk.* rwx ← So is this

. x ← So is this

Search order: ACLs + permissions

In systems like Linux that integrate ACLs with 9-bit permissions:

1. If you are the owner of the file, only owner permissions apply
2. If you are part of a group the file belongs to, only group permissions apply
3. Else search through the ACL entries to find an applicable entry
4. Else other permissions apply

macOS Examples

macOS ACL examples (1)

- **Create a file**

```
$ echo hello > hi.txt
```

```
$ cat hi.txt
```

```
hello
```

- **List the file**

- Show ACEs with -e option to ls

```
$ ls -l hi.txt
```

```
-rw-r--r--  1 paul  wheel   6 Sep 13 23:01 hi.txt
```

```
$ ls -le hi.txt
```

```
-rw-r--r--  1 paul  wheel   6 Sep 13 23:01 hi.txt
```

No ACL!

macOS ACL examples (2)

- **Take away read & write access**

- Add an access control entry with `chmod +a`
 - Remove an access control entry with `chmod -a`
- ```
$ chmod +a "paul deny read,write" hi.txt
```

- **See what we have**

```
$ ls -le hi.txt
-rw-r--r--+ 1 paul wheel 6 Sep 13 23:01 hi.txt
0: user:paul deny read,write
```

ACL

- **Add append access**

```
$ chmod +a "paul allow append" hi.txt
$ ls -le hi.txt
-rw-r--r--+ 1 paul wheel 6 Sep 13 23:01 hi.txt
0: user:paul deny read,write
1: user:paul allow append
```

ACL

# macOS ACL examples (3)

- Try reading and writing to the file

```
$ echo "new data" >hi.txt
bash: hi.txt: Permission denied
$ cat hi.txt
cat: hi.txt: Permission denied
```

- But we can append

```
$ echo "appended data" >>hi.txt
$ ls -l hi.txt
-rw-r--r--+ 1 paul wheel 20 Sep 13 23:16 hi.txt
```

- Useful for granting users append-only access to a log file

It's bigger: 20 bytes vs. 6

# macOS ACL examples (4)

- Remove Access Control Entry #0

```
$ ls -le hi.txt
```

```
-rw-r--r--+ 1 paul wheel 20 Sep 13 23:16 hi.txt
```

```
0: user:paul deny read,write
```

```
1: user:paul allow append
```

```
$ chmod -a# 0 hi.txt
```

`chmod -a# N` removes rule *N*

```
$ ls -le hi.txt
```

```
-rw-r--r--+ 1 paul wheel 20 Sep 13 23:16 hi.txt
```

```
0: user:paul allow append
```

The “deny read, write” entry is gone

- Now we can see the file

```
$ cat hi.txt
```

```
hello
```

```
appended data
```

# Changing Permissions

# Initial file permissions

On Unix-derived systems (Linux, macOS, Android, \*BSD):

- **umask** = set of permissions applications cannot set on files
  - Bitmask (octal) of bits that will be **turned off**
- To disallow **read-write-execute** for everyone but the owner
  - `umask = 000 111 111 = 077`
- Default **umask** on macOS & Ubuntu is 022
  - `022 = 000 010 010 = --- -w- -w-`
  - This takes away **write** access from group & other
  - By default, new files are readable by all and writable only by the owner

See the *umask* command and *umask* system call man pages

# Watch out for race conditions!

Suppose we create a file readable by all: `rwxr--r--`

`rwX, r, r`

- And then we change the permissions to `rwX-----`

`rwX, -, -`

```
#!/bin/bash
```

```
myapp >secretfile
```

```
chmod go-r secretfile
```

## GOOD

Create a file: `rwX-r--r-`

Change permissions to `rwX-----`

*[Attacker opens the file for reading]*

*Do your work*

## BAD

Create a file: `rwX-r--r-`

*[Attacker opens the file for reading]*

Change permissions to `rwX-----`

*Do your work*

- We don't know when the attacker will hit
- Once the attacker has the file open, changing permissions does not take access away
  - Access rights are only checked when the file is opened!

# Giving files away

- You can change the owner of a file

```
chown alice testfile
```

- Changes the file's owner to alice

- You can change the group of a file too

```
chgrp accounting testfile
```

- Changes the file's group to accounting

... but you have to be the owner to do either

# Changing user & group IDs

- **root = uid 0 = super user**

- Access to everything

- **How do you log in?**

- login program runs as uid=0

- Gets your credentials

- Authenticates you

- Then:

```
chdir(home_directory);
setgid(group_id);
setuid(user_id);
execve(user_shell, ...);
```

# Changing user ID temporarily

- **What if some files need special access?**
  - A print program needs to access the printer queue
  - A database needs to access its underlying files
- **An executable file normally runs under the user's ID**
- **A special permission bit, the “**setuid bit**” changes this**
  - **Executable files** with the setuid bit will run with the *effective UID* set to the owner of the file
  - **Directories** with the setuid bit set will force all files and sub-directories created in them to be owned by the directory owner
- **Same thing with groups – the **setgid** permission bit**
  - Executable files with this bit set will run with effective gid set to the gid of the file.

# Principle of Least Privilege

At each abstraction layer, every element (user, process, function) should be able to access **only** the resources necessary to perform its task

**Even if an element is compromised, the scope of damage is limited**

**Consider:**

- **Good:** You cannot kill another user's process
- **Good:** You cannot open the `/etc/hosts` file for writing
- **Good:** Private member functions & local variables in functions limit scope
- **Violation:** a compromised print daemon allows someone to add users
- **Violation:** a process can write a file even though there is no need to
- **Violation:** admin privileges set by default for any user account


**Least privilege is often difficult to define & enforce**

# Privilege Separation

## Divide a program into multiple parts: high & low privilege components

### Example on POSIX systems

- Each process has a *real* and *effective* user ID
- Privileges are evaluated based on the effective user ID
  - Normally, `uid == euid`
- An executable file may be tagged with a *setuid bit*
  - `chmod +sx filename`
  - When run: `uid` = user's ID  
`euid` = file owner's ID (without `setuid`, runs with user's ID)
- Separating a program
  1. Run a *setuid* program
  2. Create a communication link to self (*pipe*, *socket*, shared memory)
  3. `fork`
  4. One of the processes will call `seteuid(getuid())` to lower its privilege



# Setuid can get you into trouble!

- Most *setuid* programs ran as root
- If they were compromised, the whole system was compromised
- This was one of the best attack vectors for Unix/Linux systems

# The End